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1 
Abstract 24 
Fish stocks experiencing high fishing mortality show a tendency to mature earlier and at a 25 
smaller size, which may have a genetic component and therefore long-lasting economic and 26 
biological effects. To date, the economic effects of such eco-evolutionary dynamics have not 27 
been empirically investigated. Using 70 years of data, we develop a bio-economic model for 28 
Northeast Arctic cod to compare the economic yield in a model in which life-history traits can 29 
vary only through phenotypic plasticity with a model in which, in addition, genetic changes can 30 
occur. We find that evolutionary changes towards faster growth and earlier maturation occur 31 
consistently even if a stock is optimally managed. However, if a stock is managed optimally, 32 
the evolutionary changes actually increase economic yield because faster growth and earlier 33 
maturation raise the stock’s productivity. The optimal fishing mortality is almost identical for 34 
the evolutionary and non-evolutionary model and substantially lower than what it has been 35 
historically. Therefore, the costs of ignoring evolution under optimal management regimes are 36 
negligible. However, if fishing mortality is as high as it has been historically, evolutionary 37 
changes may result in economic losses, but only if the fishery is selecting for medium-sized 38 
individuals. As evolution facilitates growth, the fish are younger and still immature when they 39 
are susceptible to getting caught. This outweighs the increase in productivity due to fish 40 
spawning at an earlier age. 41 
 42 
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 44 
Introduction 45 
Life-history theory, experiments, and field-based studies strongly suggest that fishing is capable 46 
of inducing genetic adaptations, especially when it removes individuals with characteristics 47 
such as large body size (1-5). Even if fishing is not size-selective, high fishing mortality may 48 
be sufficient to induce genetic change (6, 7). It is difficult to predict how genetic changes at the 49 
individual level affect population-level properties. Genetic adaptations may, in principle, be 50 
beneficial for the state of a stock, by enabling individuals to invest more into reproduction and 51 
growth (1, 8). As a consequence, the stock may become more productive, allowing exploited 52 
populations to withstand higher fishing mortalities than they could in the absence of such 53 
adaptation, possibly permitting higher yields. However, while an individual’s increased 54 
reproductive investment leads to larger gonads, this happens at the expense of slower post-55 
maturation growth. Maturing earlier may also reduce fecundity, because individuals are smaller 56 
when they reproduce (9). Moreover, adapting to fishing may bear a cost of maladaptation 57 
resulting in increased natural mortality (10, 11). Therefore, fisheries-induced evolution (FIE) 58 
may reduce yield (2, 4, 12, 13) and may even imply a “Darwinian debt” (14) to be paid back by 59 
future generations, at least if genetic changes are difficult to reverse (1, 15, 16). Clearly, FIE 60 
has the potential for causing positive and negative effects on key stock properties such as 61 
spawning stock biomass (SSB) and yield, making the economic effect ambiguous. It is also an 62 
open question whether the expected size of the economic effects are substantial, largely because 63 
any evolutionary changes are closely intertwined with ecological effects. For example, the 64 
release of density dependence when population biomass is fished down, could be an important 65 
driver of phenotypic change (1, 17, 18), and might override effects of FIE on yield. To our 66 
knowledge, no study has yet to empirically investigate the economic consequences of FIE in 67 
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wild populations, and how these alter optimal fishing mortalities. Here, we ask how 68 
evolutionarily informed management differs from classical fisheries management. First, we 69 
determine how an evolving fish population should be optimally managed. Second, we analyze 70 
how these management strategies differ compared to optimal management derived for a 71 
population whose development is purely determined by ecological processes. Third, we ask 72 
how substantial the losses are if a fishery’s manager – unaware of any evolutionary changes – 73 
manages an evolving population as if it were not evolving. Fourth, we analyze how FIE affects 74 
the performance of the fishery that is not optimally managed, but heavily exploited.  75 
Northeast Arctic (NEA) cod is currently the world’s largest stock of Atlantic cod (Gadus 76 
morhua) and provides substantial ecosystem services. The stock’s fishery is an important 77 
economic resource for Norway and Russia, with annual catches by Norway being worth more 78 
than 500 million US dollars in 2010, and Russia obtaining about the same revenue. 79 
Traditionally, harvesting focused on adult cod at the stock’s spawning grounds along the 80 
Norwegian coast. From the 1930s, when industrial trawlers were introduced in the stock’s 81 
feeding grounds in the Barents Sea, immature fish came under substantial fishing pressure, 82 
while total fishing mortality increased (19). Evolutionary changes have been predicted to be a 83 
factor in explaining the observed declines in age and length at maturation in NEA cod, although 84 
the predicted extent has varied among studies (17, 20). 85 
We develop a bio-economic model to investigate if and how FIE affects economic yield 86 
(Fig. 1). Our model is a comprehensive compilation of a life-history model for a harvested 87 
species, and the economic components rely on individual vessel data, making this, as far as we 88 
are aware, the first empirically bio-economic model for investigating genetic adaptations to 89 
harvesting. It has been specifically built for NEA cod to investigate the ecological and 90 
evolutionary effects of exploitation on the changes in maturation that occurred after fishing 91 
mortality was intensified in the 1930s in the feeding grounds (17). To match the observed trends 92 
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in the biological model as closely as possible, we recreated the historical selection pressure to 93 
determine the evolvability (i.e., the coefficient of genetic variation) in the life-history traits (17). 94 
While we focus on the feeding grounds fishery in the Barents Sea, we also included fishing in 95 
the spawning grounds at the historic levels between 1932 until 2005, and at a constant rate after 96 
2006. Hence, we consider the spawning ground fishery to be beyond the control of the manager. 97 
The biological model component is built upon the individual-based eco-genetic model 98 
framework developed by ref. (1), describing four evolving life-history traits capturing key 99 
aspects of growth, maturation, and reproduction. Changes in life-history traits may be driven 100 
by both ecological processes, like phenotypic plasticity and density-dependence, and through 101 
genetic processes. To evaluate whether accounting for FIE requires a special harvest strategy, 102 
we also analyze a non-evolutionary version of the biological model in which the genetic traits 103 
cannot evolve. We therefore compare a non-evolutionary model, in which changes in 104 
populations are driven only by phenotypic plasticity, with an evolutionary model that allows, 105 
in addition, for genetic adaptations. The economic model component consists of production and 106 
cost functions estimated specifically for the Norwegian cod trawler fleet. We incorporate a 107 
demand function, also estimated from empirical data, to account for how total catch affects the 108 
price of landings (21). Our model incorporates feedbacks between the stock development and 109 
the economic gains through an optimal harvest control rule (HCR), which is constrained by the 110 
two parameters Bmax and Fmax (Fig. 1). Such shape makes it directly comparable to the HCR 111 
that was implemented for NEA cod in 2004 (22, 23). We search for the parameter combination 112 
that gives the highest net present value (NPV) for the objective fleet profits. We derive HCRs 113 
that are either optimized in the evolutionary or non-evolutionary version of the model.  114 
 115 
Results  116 
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We first compare the emerging properties of the evolutionary model with the non-evolutionary 117 
model, when both are managed according to what an HCR recommends that has been optimized 118 
for fleet profits (see Table 1, “Evolution” vs. “Ecology”). We find that the optimal fishing 119 
mortality is almost identical for the evolutionary and non-evolutionary model and substantially 120 
lower than what it has been historically. In spite of this, the emerging biomass levels and the 121 
total allowable catch (TAC) are higher in the evolutionary model, indicating that evolution 122 
indeed makes the stock more productive, permitting higher yields for the same fishing 123 
mortality. Overall, the NPV of the fishery is higher when evolution occurs, even though the 124 
total effect is very small. Given that the recommended fishing mortalities are almost identical, 125 
the loss of disregarding any evolutionary effects is negligible and the NPV is still higher if 126 
evolution occurs and ignored by managers (Table 1, “Evolution ignored”). The key message 127 
here is that a low fishing mortality is optimal, no matter whether genetic changes occur or not. 128 
This prediction holds for different discount rates (Table S3), when sales prices are assumed 129 
independent of the total catch, and when the price that can be obtained per kg of cod rises with 130 
the weight of the fish (Table S4).  131 
Given that fishing mortality has not been low for the NEA cod fishery in the past, and 132 
worldwide most fisheries are still far from being managed optimally, we also investigate how 133 
evolution affects the stock when it is overexploited. To do so, we use historic fishing mortalities 134 
between 1932 and 2006 and the average fishing mortality afterwards to simulate a scenario of 135 
high fishing pressure. This is then contrasted with a counterfactual scenario that analyzes how 136 
the fate of the fishery would have developed if an optimal HCR had been already introduced in 137 
1932 (as given in Table 1, “Evolution”). We find that using an optimal HCR leads to higher 138 
biomass levels in the evolutionary model, compared to the case where only ecological effects 139 
are present. The opposite is true for the scenario of historically high fishing mortality, where 140 
biomass is actually slightly lower in the evolutionary model (Fig. 2A). As a result, the 141 
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corresponding TAC and NPV are also slightly lower when evolution occurs and fishing 142 
mortality is high (Table S2). 143 
It is not immediately obvious why evolution has a positive effect on the fishery if fishing 144 
mortality is set optimally, but a negative effect if fishing mortality is high. Inspecting key life 145 
history traits reveal that age at maturation declines over time in all scenarios (Fig. 2B). While 146 
this occurs in the non-evolutionary model (solely as a result of phenotypic plasticity), the 147 
decline is even more severe when evolution takes place. A decline in length at maturation occurs 148 
in all scenarios as well, and is even more pronounced if fishing mortality is high (Fig. 2C). In 149 
spite of reduced age and length at maturation, the reproductive output per unit of SSB, a 150 
measure of the stock’s productivity, is increasing over time when evolution occurs (Fig. 2D). 151 
In order to better understand the population structure, we take a closer look at the age 152 
composition at the simulation endpoints (Fig. 3). We find that in spite of individual fish being 153 
smaller at maturation, the size at a given age is consistently larger for the evolutionary model 154 
compared to the non-evolutionary model, irrespective of the fishing mortality being optimal or 155 
high (Fig. 3A). Indeed, the underlying genetic trait changes show that the evolving population 156 
invests more in intrinsic somatic growth capacity and reproductive investment, with the end 157 
result being overall larger body sizes and higher reproductive output (Fig. 3A, S1). Looking 158 
closer at the age structure of the fish makes it immediately clear that the evolutionary loss occurs 159 
because the number of individuals in each age-class is much lower if fishing mortality is high 160 
and evolution occurs (Fig. 3B). The fish grow quicker and mature earlier in the evolutionary 161 
scenario when fishing pressure is high, but these genetic changes do not pay off in terms of 162 
population biomass, TAC or NPV, because fish are also younger (and still immature) when 163 
they are potentially caught by trawlers, which spare all fish below the minimum size limit of 164 
45 cm. It might seem surprising that these genetic changes towards faster growth occur, given 165 
that this makes the fish more vulnerable to fishing at an earlier age. However, faster growth 166 
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also means maturing earlier, which enables individuals to have a higher probability to reproduce 167 
and pass on genes before being captured by the fishery.  168 
If interactions with the environment are responsible for the evolutionary loss, it may be 169 
sufficient to tweak the environment to avoid or reverse these losses. Indeed, we find that 170 
changing the minimum size limit is sufficient to avoid any evolutionary costs (Fig. 4). With a 171 
very low minimum size limit, evolution is unambiguously good for the fishery, because it leads 172 
to individual growth that is fast enough to negate any detrimental effects of early maturation on 173 
TACs (Fig. 4A). As expected, evolution has little effect on the TAC when the minimum size 174 
limit is high because selection acting on maturation and growth is weaker and there is little 175 
difference between the evolutionary and non-evolutionary predictions (Fig. 4C and S4). 176 
Therefore, the loss in NPV due to evolution only occurs for intermediate minimum size limits, 177 
where the beneficial effects of growing faster are swamped out by making those fish more 178 
vulnerable who are larger, but also younger and still immature (Table S5).  179 
In this study, the coefficient of genetic variation was set at a level that resulted in the 180 
best fit to empirical observations in age and length at maturation (Table S1), but we nonetheless 181 
investigated the effect of this parameter (the evolvability of traits) on model predictions. As 182 
expected (1, 16, 24, 25), higher genetic variance resulted in fish maturing at even younger ages 183 
and smaller sizes, while also growing faster. Consequently, higher TACs can be obtained when 184 
the evolvability is high, predicting that stronger evolutionary forces can have a positive effect 185 
on the fishery (Fig. S3).  186 
 187 
Discussion 188 
Our model predicts that evolutionary change occurs even if fishing mortality is low, which 189 
implies that a management strategy aimed at avoiding genetic change might not be feasible. At 190 
the same time, we find that fisheries-induced evolution is not necessarily bad for the fishery, 191 
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and most of the time even beneficial. Especially a fishery that is managed according to what is 192 
ecologically optimal can safely ignore any evolutionary effects – at least for the stock and under 193 
the conditions that we are considering. This finding is very surprising and in contrast to much 194 
of the existing literature, which tends to sketch a gloomy picture of the potential consequences 195 
of FIE. It is also comforting that fishing can cause evolution of faster growth, allowing the 196 
population to withstand higher harvest pressure and prevent stock collapse (Fig S3). 197 
Nonetheless, the life-history changes we predict could have management implications because 198 
they affect important indicators that are commonly used to assess the state of the stock. 199 
Evolution tends to increase the ratio between SSB and total biomass (Fig. S2), which could 200 
mask a decreasing trend in total biomass and affect the stock-recruitment relationship with 201 
associated accuracy of predictions (25). This may furthermore have important management 202 
implications when biomass levels approach SSB-based limit reference points (26). Even more 203 
worrisome is our finding that evolutionary effects tend to be more important when a fish stock 204 
is overexploited and the fishery is intermediately size selective. Admittedly, such institutional 205 
setting is a special case, but unfortunately the one that worldwide most fisheries are facing. 206 
Surprisingly, an economic cost of evolution under these conditions does not materialize because 207 
of a drop in reproductive output or as many might expect because of a reduction in growth or 208 
size-at-age (27). To the contrary, evolution here promoted faster growth, yet still could exact 209 
an economic cost. These results underscore the importance of management taking into account 210 
the detailed age and size-structure of the stock (28-30).  211 
While we find that removing selectively individuals of intermediate size may result in 212 
economic losses due to evolutionary change, we do not find any evidence that targeting only 213 
large fish results in evolutionary loss (Fig. 4). These findings may shed new light on the 214 
discussion whether harvesting should be balanced or selective (31). While we assume a knife-215 
edge selectivity in our model (32, 33), different gear types with selectivity patterns remain to 216 
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be explored for further research. While gear regulation can – in principle – be easily changed, 217 
our findings may also hint at broader problems. If predation is size selective, evolutionary 218 
changes may affect natural mortality which may lead to similar consequences as fishing 219 
mortality (10, 11). Investigating how FIE acts in concert with natural mortality, climatic 220 
changes, or other driving forces remains to be explored, especially in the light of recovery 221 
potential (16).  222 
While our biological model is very complex, the optimal HCR was constrained by two 223 
parameters, resembling the shape of the HCR currently adopted for NEA cod. It would be 224 
interesting to see to what extent our results carry over to a simpler biological model that could 225 
then be used for more flexible optimization routines treating the minimum size limit, for 226 
example, as a choice variable. Another interesting avenue is to separately optimize harvest 227 
control rules for the NEA cod’s feeding and spawning grounds. Previous research has found 228 
predictions for fisheries-induced evolution to differ depending on whether management actions 229 
target feeding or spawning grounds (34).  Here, we focused on the fishery in the stock’s feeding 230 
grounds and kept the fishing mortality at observed levels in the stock’s spawning grounds to 231 
mimic the historic selection pressure on mature fish, while parsimoniously asking what can be 232 
changed for the trawler fleet in the Barents Sea.   233 
Altogether, our results show that the economic consequences of FIE are rather small, and mostly 234 
beneficial. This is largely because of the positive effects of fishing on growth. This prediction 235 
is made possible because of the crucial eco-evolutionary feedbacks between biomass, growth 236 
and maturation and because of the inclusion of growth as an evolving trait. Models that don’t 237 
include these crucial factors might incorrectly predict a larger economic cost of evolution.  238 
Regardless, low fishing mortality is the key for successful management. Today, many fish 239 
stocks are still far away from being managed in an ecologically optimal way. In such a case, 240 
our model predicts that FIE enables the stock to withstand higher harvests, but only if fishing 241 
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mortality is not intermediately selective. Otherwise, FIE may reduce economic yield and make 242 
the stock actually less viable. Admittedly, these evolutionary costs are very small, but they may 243 
just be enough to push a fish stock from the state of overexploitation into collapse. 244 
 245 
Materials and methods 246 
Our bio-economic model consists of two sub-models: “the biological model” which is a 247 
description of the life-cycle of NEA cod, and “the economic model” describing details such as 248 
cost and demand for the NEA cod trawl fishery. Each of the sub-models have been specifically 249 
estimated and calibrated for this stock by using data from the time period 1932-2007 (Table 250 
S1). A more extensive model description can be found in SI Materials and Methods. 251 
 252 
The biological model 253 
The biological model is individual-based and has been developed in ref. (17) building upon the 254 
“eco-genetic” modeling framework derived in ref. (1). The model describes each individual’s 255 
growth, maturation, reproduction and mortality in each year and follows the fate of about 256 
50,000 super-individuals (34, 35). If a fish reproduces, genetic traits are inherited by offspring 257 
and expressed phenotypically. Mortality acts on these phenotypic traits, resulting in selection 258 
that may cause a genetic response in the life-history traits (Fig. 1A). We made two versions of 259 
our model, an evolutionary and a non-evolutionary version, each modeling their respective 260 
population of individuals in order to compare a population that has the propensity to evolve, 261 
with a population that does not evolve. We consider the evolution of four quantitative life-262 
history traits: maturation tendency given by the (i) slope and (ii) intercept of a probabilistic 263 
maturation reaction norm (20), (iii) growth capacity and (iv) reproductive investment. The 264 
genetic traits evolve independently, and we therefore do not account for pleiotropy or genetic 265 
linkage between traits. Our model has limitations, but thanks to the data availability for NEA 266 
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cod, we are able to include estimates of the initial mean life-history trait values and annual 267 
exploitation rates, as well as parameters specifying the stock-recruitment relationship (i.e., 268 
newborn mortality) and the density dependence of growth on stock biomass (17). Furthermore, 269 
a growth-survival tradeoff is included and the strength of this trade-off was determined by 270 
matching the ecological properties for data on age and length at maturation, phenotypic growth 271 
and biomass from 1932-1950 in the non-evolutionary version of the model to reach 272 
demographic equilibrium (17). In the evolving population, the coefficient of genetic variation 273 
(CV) has been determined empirically for each trait (17) by matching trends in age and length 274 
at maturation over a 74 year period (i.e. from 1932-2005). In this calibration, the historic 275 
selection pressure was mimicked by using annual harvest probabilities in the feeding and 276 
spawning ground from 1932 until 2005. The resultant CV has been found to be lower than what 277 
was assumed in previous studies using the same modeling framework but not based on specific 278 
stocks (1, 16, 24, 25), as was the case here. For the non-evolving population, which is only 279 
driven by ecological processes, the CV is equal to zero. 280 
 281 
The economic model and harvest control rule 282 
The economic model (i) specifies the harvest function, (ii) specifies the profit function, (iii) 283 
derives a procedure for allocating fishing quotas, and (iv) derives the demand function. All of 284 
these functions have been estimated and derived in detail in ref. (36) and used in ref. (21). We 285 
assume a knife-edge selectivity (32, 33) that targets all fish above the size of 45 cm (17, 37). 286 
The biological and economic models are linked together through an annual feedback loop: 287 
spawning stock biomass (SSB) is fed into the economic model where ultimately the total 288 
allowable catch (TAC) is determined by a harvest control rule (HCR). The derived TAC feeds 289 
back into the biological model and affects the stock size (Fig. 1, “realized catch”). The shape 290 
of the HCR is based on the one that was implemented for NEA cod in 2004 (22, 23): the 291 
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maximum fishing mortality Fmax is allowed above a certain SSB level, given by the parameter 292 
Bmax. Below Bmax, fishing mortality decreases linearly to the origin (Fig. 1B). We explore model 293 
simulations over a large grid of combinations of Fmax and Bmax, searching for those 294 
combinations that maximize the economic objective, fleet profit. All results, such as those for 295 
SSB and TAC,, are given for a population that has been scaled up by a factor of 100,000. As 296 
the model is stochastic, we ran each scenario for 15 independent replicates, and then averaged 297 
across these, presenting the mean in the tables and figures. 298 
 299 
Historic fishing pressure 300 
The observed harvest pressure in the feeding ground increased steadily from the 1930s to the 301 
middle of the 1960s and remained high until the mid- 2000. In the “historic fishing” scenarios, 302 
we use observed fishing mortalities from 1932-2005 and then assume a constant fishing 303 
mortality in the feeding ground (0.68 year-1) being maintained from 2006 and into the future. 304 
This constant (0.68 year-1) is an average of the historic fishing mortality between 1946-2005 305 
and is higher than what is considered to be precautionary for the NEA cod (0.4 year-1) (37).  306 
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Figure legends 420 
Fig. 1. An overview of the bio-economic model. (A) The biological and economic models are 421 
coupled by the harvest control rule (HCR). The individual-based biological model describes the 422 
evolution of key life-history traits if genetic changes are allowed to occur in the model. The 423 
economic model accounts for the supply and demand side of the fishery, as well as fleet profit 424 
generated. (B) The shape of the HCR depends on two parameters: above the level Bmax of 425 
spawning stock biomass the maximum fishing mortality Fmax is allowed. Between Bmax and a 426 
biomass level of zero, fishing mortality linearly decreases from Fmax to zero. The structure of 427 
this HCR is in agreement with that advised in 2004 by ICES (The International Council for the 428 
Exploration of the Sea) for the NEA cod fishery. 429 
 430 
Fig. 2. The first scenario is based on an optimal harvest control rule (HCR) maximizing fleet 431 
profit (green shading shows the period for which we have data), and the second scenario of 432 
historic fishing mortality is based on the observed fishing mortalities for 1932-2005 (red 433 
shading), and from 2006 onwards follows the average fishing mortality for 1946-2005. For each 434 
scenario, the emerging properties from an evolutionary model (black) are compared with those 435 
of the corresponding non-evolutionary model (grey). (A) Total biomass for ages 3 years plus 436 
(1000 t) is lower in the evolutionary model when fishing mortality is high, but higher in the 437 
evolutionary model when the optimal HCR is used. (B) Predicted age at maturation and (C) 438 
length at maturation is lower in the evolutionary model than in the non-evolutionary model. 439 
The historic scenario predicts age and length at maturation to fall to between age 6-7, and 60-440 
70 cm in 2005, in agreement with the observed data. (D) Stock productivity, i.e. mean gonad 441 
mass divided by total spawning stock biomass, increases when evolution occurs, and even more 442 
so if fishing mortality is high. 443 
 444 
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Fig. 3. Eco-evolutionary dynamics and age-truncation. The optimal HCR scenario is shown by 445 
green bars, while high fishing mortality is indicated with red bars. The evolutionary model 446 
outcome is shown in the full bars, while the non-evolutionary one is shown by grey inner bars. 447 
(A) the mean size is larger for all age-classes if evolution occurs, (B) the numbers of individuals 448 
in each age class is much lower if evolution occurs, but only if fishing mortality is high. 449 
 450 
Fig. 4. (A-C) Total allowable catch (TAC) under different minimum size limits and for different 451 
constant fishing mortalities. The evolutionary model (black) predicts higher TAC than the non-452 
evolutionary model (grey) when selection also acts on very young fish. For a minimum size 453 
limit of 85 cm, the two models are not different. At the intermediate minimum size limit of 45 454 
cm, the TAC is highest for the evolutionary model when fishing mortality is low, but as fishing 455 
intensity increases, the TAC is smaller for the evolutionary model. 456 
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Table 1. Optimal harvest control rule (HCR) for an evolutionary model (“Evolution”) and 
non-evolutionary model (“Ecology”). Values shown are averages for 1932-2100 on fishing 
mortality (F), catch (TAC), spawning stock biomass (SSB), with temporal standard deviation 
in parentheses, and NPV with a discount rate of 2%. “Evolution ignored” uses an evolutionary 
model with the ecologically optimal HCR. 
  
Model F TAC SSB NPV 
Evolution 0.34 469 (60) 767 (163) 25.4 
Ecology 0.35 443 (48) 643 (118) 25.3 
Evolution 
ignored  
0.35 470 (60) 735 (155) 25.4 
Units: F (inst. rate), TAC, SSB (1000 tonnes); NPV (billion USD). 
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SI text 23 
The Supporting Information consists of two main sections: (i) SI Materials and Methods and 24 
(ii) SI Results. In the methods section, we describe the biological and economic component in 25 
the bio-economic model, including a description of the data used to parameterize the model 26 
(Table S1). At the end of the SI Materials and Methods, we discuss model limitations. In the 27 
SI Results, we show in greater depth the emerging properties of the “historic fishing” scenario 28 
that may give rise to an evolutionary cost. Also, we investigate the implications of alternative 29 
discount rates for deriving optimal harvest control rules. Furthermore, we probe into the 30 
robustness of our results. Simulating different levels of constant fishing mortality rates (0.2-31 
0.8 yr-1), we evaluate the impact of changing the minimum size limit, assuming a constant 32 
price, weight-dependent price, and finally, changing the coefficient of genetic variation (i.e., 33 
evolvability) of the genetic life-history traits. 34 
 35 
SI Materials and Methods: Model and data description 36 
Biological model 37 
The biological model is individual-based and based upon the framework developed by ref. 38 
(1). It combines quantitative genetics with ecological processes taking place at the individual 39 
level to derive knowledge on how fishing pressure progressively affects the stock at the 40 
population level. The genetic component of this model allows the individuals to adapt to the 41 
selection pressure brought about by harvesting. The individual-based model follows about 42 
50,000 super-individuals (2, 3). All models results, such as spawning stock biomass (SSB) 43 
and catch, are given for a population that has been scaled up by a factor of 100,000 to recreate 44 
realistic stock levels. Parameter values for our model (Table S1) are based on published 45 
sources, data collected by the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research (IMR) and the 46 
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Fisheries Directorate, and survey data made available through the International Council for 47 
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). This model has been developed and calibrated for the NEA 48 
cod stock in ref. (4). A similar model was used in ref. (5) for the same stock, without 49 
considering any evolutionary dynamics. 50 
Evolutionary dynamics 51 
This section describes first how we model the phenotypic expression of the genetic traits for 52 
individual maturation tendency, growth, and reproductive investment, secondly, how we 53 
introduce the distribution of the evolving genetic traits in the initial population, and finally, 54 
how the traits are inherited by offspring. Each genetic trait Gz  (denoted by subscript G) has a 55 
corresponding phenotypic trait value Pz  (denoted by subscript P), with a genetic variance 56 
2
z,Gσ  and phenotypic variance 2z,P.σ  At the population level, we assume phenotypic variance 57 
to be the sum of the genetic and environmental variance 2 2 2
z,P z,G z,E( )σ σ σ= + . Based on 58 
quantitative genetics (6) each trait has a heritability, 2 2 2
z,G z,P/ ,zh σ σ= which allows us to 59 
calculate the environmental variance ( )2 2 2z,E z,G 1zhσ σ −= −  for each trait in the initial 60 
population (where 2z,Gσ is empirically determined for each trait, see below). This 61 
environmental variance was then subsequently kept constant through time. The four 62 
considered quantitative genetic traits are the maturation tendency by a probabilistic 63 
maturation reaction norm (PMRN) (i) slope GGz s=  and (ii) intercept GGz i= ; (iii) growth 64 
capacity GGz g= ; and (iv) reproductive investment given by the gonado-somatic index 65 
GGSI .Gz =  In the initial population, the genetic traits are assumed to be normally distributed 66 
with mean initial trait values and genetic variances determined by the coefficient of genetic 67 
variation 
,GCVz , both based on empirical data (Table S1). The genetic traits are expressed 68 
phenotypically by random draws from a normal distribution with means equal to the 69 
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respective genetic trait (see Table S1 for initial values), with the corresponding environmental 70 
variances 2Eσ . We made an evolutionary and a non-evolutionary version of the model, each 71 
modeling their respective population of individuals in order to compare a population that has 72 
the propensity to evolve, with a population that does not evolve. First, the non-evolutionary 73 
model was calibrated to accomplish a match with data on Northeast arctic (NEA) cod 74 
phenotypic growth, biomass, and age and length at maturation for the period 1932-1950 (4). 75 
For the non-evolving population, which is only driven by ecological processes, the coefficient 76 
of genetic variation (
,GCVz ) equals zero. In the evolving population, ,GCVz  was determined 77 
by matching trends in age and length at maturation over a 74 year period (i.e., 1932-2005). 78 
For all four evolving traits these were then varied to determine the amount of evolution 79 
needed to match the maturation trends for 1932-2005. The range of evaluated coefficients of 80 
genetic variation, 
,GCVz  was between 0% and 12% and based on previous models (1, 7-9). All 81 
possible combinations were systematically evaluated and ranked by log likelihood. The 82 
combination that ranked best was consequently selected and used to define the 
,GCVz  values 83 
for each trait.  84 
Offspring inherited genetic trait values from their parents by drawing randomly from 85 
normal distributions with means equal to the mid-parental genetic trait values (i.e., the 86 
arithmetic mean trait value of the two parents) and variances equal to half the variance for a 87 
given genetic trait in the initial population (thus assuming a constant recombination–88 
segregation–mutation kernel; see ref. (1, 10)). After the initial year (e.g., the first year in the 89 
simulation), genetic means, heritabilities and the trait distributions could change freely as 90 
determined by the processes of maturation, somatic growth, reproduction, natural mortality, 91 
and harvesting mortality. These processes were applied sequentially in each year to all 92 
individuals. 93 
4 
Maturation, growth, reproduction and natural mortality 94 
Each year, the probability 
mp  that an immature individual will mature is described by a 95 
probabilistic maturation reaction norm, PMRN (11, 12). This is a function of the individual’s 96 
length l  and age a  and given by ( )( ) 1m p50,1 exp / .ap l l v − = + − −   The length 50,p al  is where 97 
the maturation probability 
mp  is equal to 50% at age a, as given by P50, P P ,al i s a= +  with a 98 
phenotypic intercept Pi  and slope Ps . The parameter v is determined by the lower bound 99 
probability 
up  (25%) and the upper bound probability lp  (75%) of the maturation envelope 100 
(1, 4), together with the PMRN width, as given by 
1
1
1/ ln
1
l
u
p
v w
p
−
− −= − . 101 
To reflect density-dependence in growth brought about by changes in abundance, and 102 
consequently competition and resource availability, we used an estimated relationship of 103 
phenotypic growth P,D, P, exp( )t t tg g xB= −  depending on total stock biomass tB  in year t . The 104 
hypothetical length increment where biomass tB  is zero is referred to as the maximum growth 105 
increment, and x  is the strength of density dependence reducing growth relative to this 106 
maximum. For this estimation (Table S1), derived in detail in ref. (4) and used in ref. (5), we 107 
used data on annual growth increments and biomass for the period 1978-2009, obtained from 108 
survey and stock assessment (4, 13). The parameters were estimated by regressing log-109 
transformed mean annual growth increments for ages 0 to 5 years in the winter survey against 110 
total biomass and other co-variates (R2= 73 %), see ref. (4). For the immature individuals, 111 
denoted by a superscript I, the body length in a given year depends on the length in the 112 
previous year and the growth increment in that year, I I 1 ,D, 1t t P tl l g− −= + . Mature individuals, 113 
denoted by a superscript M, also allocate resources to reproduction, depending on the 114 
reproductive investment. This is given by the phenotypic gonado-somatic index PGSI  and a 115 
conversion factor, γ , needed to account for the higher energy content of gonadic tissue 116 
5 
relative to somatic tissue (14, 15). Consequently, the length of a mature individual is given by 117 
M M
1 P,D, 1 P, 13( ) / (3 GSI )t t t tl l g γ− − −=+ + . An individual female’s fecundity f  is determined by its 118 
length l  and gonado-somatic index phenotype PGSI  and given by PGSI ,jf kl D=  where D  119 
is the weight-specific packing density of oocytes (16), and k  and j  are allometric constants 120 
relating body length to body mass. The gonad weight at a given age can be calculated from 121 
fecundity by dividing it by the weight-specific packing density (shown in Fig. S1). An 122 
individual’s probability to mate is proportional to its gonad mass, where large gonads due to 123 
larger body size and/or gonado-somatic index result in a higher production of gametes (eggs 124 
and sperm), and therefore in the production of more offspring. In our model, sex was assigned 125 
randomly at birth at a 1:1 primary sex ratio. Atlantic cod are batch spawners and so may mate 126 
with several different partners (17, 18). We therefore assumed mating to be random with 127 
replacement.  128 
The individuals can die from natural or fishing mortality. In our model, natural 129 
mortality originated from three sources: newborn mortality, cost of growth, and a constant 130 
background natural mortality. The density-dependent newborn mortality was modelled by 131 
using an estimated Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment relationship (19) from VPA-data (20, 21). 132 
Recruitment depends on spawning stock biomass SSBt  in year t  and sea surface temperature 133 
SSTt , reflecting the impact of climate. The sea surface temperature stretches from the Kola 134 
meridian transect (33°50’ E, 70°50’ N to 72°50’ N) and has been shown to be a good 135 
indicator for recruitment for Northeast Arctic cod (22-25). The expected number 3,R t  of 136 
recruits at age 3 is then given by ( )( )3, 3 0 1 2R SST SSB / 1 SSB ,t t t tc c c+ = + +  where 0c , 1c  and 2c  137 
are statistically estimated parameters ( 2 58.9%R = ). The two density-dependent parameters 138 
1c  and 2c  were scaled to the modeled population (Table S1). Annual temperature data from 139 
1932-2005 was fed into the modelled stock-recruitment relationship and after 2006 we used 140 
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the average from 1995-2005. In this stock-recruitment model, we ignore cannibalism, even 141 
though it has been shown to be important for natural mortality in young age-classes (24, 26). 142 
We found the expected number 0,R t  of newborn recruits by back-calculating the predicted 143 
number of 3-year olds, assuming an annual total natural mortality probability equal to 0.2 yr-1 144 
as conventionally done for this stock in assessment (21). The survival probability of the 145 
offspring of a given spawning pair was equal to 0,R t  divided by the total fecundity of the 146 
spawning population. 147 
The second source of mortality, the growth-survival trade-off, accounts for less energy 148 
available for maintenance (27, 28) and lower survival as growth increases. This may be a 149 
result of, for example, risky foraging behavior (29, 30). We therefore included a trade-off 150 
between an individual’s survival and genetic growth capacity Gg  through the extra mortality 151 
probability g G max/m g g= , where maxg  is the maximal genetic growth increment at which the 152 
survival probability drops to zero, and determines the strength of this trade-off. The parameter 153 
maxg  is a priori unknown and has been determined in a non-evolutionary model to imitate the 154 
stock demographically from 1932-1950 (4), by varying 
maxg  from 50-200 cm, in steps of 5 155 
cm, resulting in 31 evaluated combinations. This grid covered the range of values being 156 
assumed in published versions of this model (1, 7). Comparing model predictions with time-157 
series data on phenotypic growth, biomass and mean age and length at maturation for the 158 
period 1932-1950, the growth-survival tradeoff, maxg  was determined by log likelihood 159 
(Table S1). Together, the background natural mortality and the additional mortality resulting 160 
from the growth-survival trade-off produced annual natural mortality probabilities, m  equal 161 
to 0.18, as assumed by ICES in its VPA analyses (Table S1). 162 
As is the case for NEA cod, harvesting was implemented in the model separately in 163 
the feeding grounds and spawning grounds. In the feeding grounds, harvesting was size-164 
7 
selective with minimum-size limits within the range recorded for NEA cod from the 1980s 165 
onwards (31). In the spawning grounds, only mature individuals were harvested and there was 166 
no minimum-size limit. Due to annual spawning migration out of the feeding ground at about 167 
¼ of the year, the harvest probability of mature fish on the feeding grounds was 3/401 (1 )p− − , 168 
where 0p  is the harvest probability for the immature fish.  169 
 170 
Economic model 171 
To calculate the welfare effects of harvesting, we specify first the harvest function, second, 172 
the profit function, third, derive a procedure for allocating fishing quotas, and fourth, derive 173 
the demand function. All of these functions have been estimated and derived in detail in ref. 174 
(32) and used in ref. (5). Furthermore, we specify the objective functions to derive an optimal 175 
harvest control rule.  176 
The harvest function  177 
Following ref. (33) and ref. (34), the harvest function of vessel i in year t  is given by a Cobb-178 
Douglas production function 
,it t i th qB e
α β= , where q  is a catchability coefficient, tB  is the 179 
amount of biomass, and 
,i te  is fishing effort. In our model, effort is defined as the number of 180 
days a boat is fishing cod north of 62° N, multiplied by the size (given in Gross Tonnage) of 181 
the boat. The stock-output elasticity α and effort-output elasticity β describe how harvest 182 
changes when the respective inputs, biomass and effort, change. 183 
The profit function 184 
The cost data for each vessel contains expenses made for “labor wages and shares to crew”, 185 
“social expenses” (i.e. payroll-related expenses, such as employer contributions to pension 186 
and the employer portion of social security tax), “fuel and lubrication oil”, “bait, ice, salt, and 187 
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packaging“, “food expenses to crew”, as well as “maintenance on vessel”, “maintenance and 188 
investment on gear”, “insurance on vessel”, “other insurances”, “depreciation on vessel” and 189 
“other operating expenses”; see also ref. (35). In total, there are 11 cost components, which 190 
are indexed k = 1 ... 11. Total costs incurred by vessel i in year t are given by the vector of 191 
nominal cost components, 
,ik tC  which are subsequently corrected for inflation using the 192 
Producer Price Index, PPI. We calculate the part of the total costs incurred for catching cod by 193 
the share of days vessel i spends on catching cod in the total number of days vessel i is fishing 194 
at sea. Using index j to enumerate all eight fish species caught (with cod being j = 8) and 195 
denoting the number of days in year t that vessel i catches species j by 
,ij tD , the total number 196 
of days vessel i spends catching fish in year t is equal to 
8
,1
.ij tj D=∑ Therefore, the costs 197 
attributed to catching cod by vessel i in year t are ( ) ( )11 8, 8, , ,1 1/ PPI .i t i t ik t t ij tk jC D c D=== ∑ ∑  198 
We empirically determine which fraction of the costs of fishing per boat 
,i tC  comprise 199 
fixed and variable costs by estimating 
, ,i t f v i tC c c e= + , where fc  can be interpreted as fixed 200 
costs, while 
vc
 
are variable costs. Multiplying the catch 
,i th  of vessel i  with the price of cod 201 
tP  yields the revenue ,t i tPh  of vessel .i  The profit ,i tπ  of vessel i  is then given by offsetting 202 
this revenue with the costs of vessel i and given by 
, , ,i t t i t f v i tPh c c eπ = − − .   203 
Issuing individual quotas 204 
Harvest quotas could in principle be allocated through a market mechanism, such as an 205 
auction or handed out by the government to the boat owners. It is not clear a priori what the 206 
most efficient allocation (or market outcome) is, because the size of the quota and number of 207 
quotas can vary. Each boat faces a fixed cost, but is harvesting less efficiently when the size 208 
of the quota per boat increases, determined by the estimated effort-output elasticity (see 209 
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parameter β in Table S1). For each year t , we identify an optimal number *tn  of vessels 210 
harvesting an optimal number *e  of tonnage days for a given TAC and total stock biomass (for 211 
details see ref. (32)), where * 1 *t t tn H q e Bβ α− − −= .  212 
The demand function 213 
The NEA cod fishery contributes a large part of the world’s cod landings and therefore affects 214 
the international market price for cod. To describe this relationship, we use a linear demand 215 
function, 0 1t tP b b H= − , where tP  is the price for cod in year t , tH  is the total harvested 216 
biomass in year t  (as determined by the TAC), and 0b  and 1b  are parameters. The inverse 217 
price elasticity is estimated to be 0.5, i.e. if the supply of cod increases by 1%, the world price 218 
drops by 0.5% (32). Using the average kg price in the period 1998-2007 (in 2000 NOK) of 219 
12.59 NOK, and the average landing of 527.8 thousand tonnes, allows us to solve for 0b  and 220 
1b  (see Table S1).  221 
The objective function and the harvest control rule 222 
Each year, the NEA cod fishery generates economic profits for the fishing fleet, given by tΠ . 223 
Finding the maximum economic yield requires us to maximize the net present value (NPV) of 224 
the fishery over T years, as given by ( )( )
0
NPV 1/ 1
T
t
t
t
δ== Π +∑ , where δ  is the discount rate.  225 
The HCR implemented for the NEA cod fishery in 2004 translates precautionary 226 
reference points into a management plan (21, 36). Below these reference points the stock is at 227 
risk of being harvested unsustainably. The implemented HCR for the NEA cod in 2004 228 
consists of two parameters (37, 38): a maximum fishing mortality Fpa is followed if the 229 
biomass level is above the precautionary biomass level Bpa; below this biomass level the 230 
10 
fishing mortality decreases linearly to the origin, i.e. fishing mortality is zero at a biomass 231 
level of zero.  232 
 Here, we generalize a HCR with two parameters (Fig. 1b) that can be compared with 233 
the implemented management plan. If the SSB is between zero and Bmax, the instantaneous 234 
fishing mortality for the given year is given by max maxSSB /F B . If the SSB is larger than Bmax, 235 
the fishing mortality is equal to Fmax. The current HCR is therefore recovered as a special 236 
case when Bmax=Bpa and Fmax=Fpa. In our model, we vary the parameters in the HCR over a 237 
wide range of values, not constraining them to existing precautionary reference points. We 238 
search for the combination of parameter values Bmax and Fmax that deliver the best results for 239 
the objective function (maximize profit) and identify those as optima. The grid size for the 240 
parameters gave a grid of 4141 different HCRs. The parameters Bmax were varied from 0-800 241 
thousand tonnes in steps of 20, and the instantaneous fishing mortality Fmax varied from 0.2-242 
1.2 yr-1 in steps of 0.01 yr-1. Our model is individual-based, and for some of these HCRs, 243 
fishing could make the abundance very low. To avoid stochastic effects at low abundances, 244 
we therefore set a threshold below which the population was classified as extinct (at 20 245 
modelled mature “super-individuals”), see ref. (3, 4). The computations were completed on 246 
Abel, the computer cluster with 10000+ cores at the Research Computing Services at the 247 
University of Oslo. 248 
 249 
Model limitations 250 
As with all models, our bioeconomic model has limitations and simplifications. A few 251 
assumptions merit special attention here. First, we assume an initial 1:1 sex ratio although it 252 
has been shown that the sex ratio has fluctuated over time in this cod stock (39). Second, we 253 
assume no sexual selection, though it is possible that sexual selection may influence the 254 
evolutionary changes in life-history traits (40-42). Third, we do not include genetic 255 
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correlations between the life-history traits describing maturation tendency, growth capacity, 256 
and reproductive investment (4). Fourth, we assume a constant minimum size limit that 257 
determines the harvestable biomass (Table S1), implicitly assuming knife-edge selectivity 258 
(19, 43), which may not be fully realistic. Although our size limit is based on data, the size 259 
selectivity has varied over the considered time period and across vessels since 1932 (for 260 
sensitivity analysis on minimum size limit, see Table S5). Fifth, the shape of the HCR we are 261 
considering is constrained by two parameters, reflecting the current management plan. 262 
Investigating completely different shapes or considering parameters that change over time is 263 
an interesting avenue for further research. Sixth, we focused on the fishery in the stock’s 264 
feeding grounds and kept the fishing mortality at observed levels in the stock’s spawning 265 
grounds. We did this because we wanted to mimic the historic selection pressure on the 266 
mature fish, while parsimoniously asking what can be changed for the trawler fleet in the 267 
Barents Sea. This assumption could be changed, and the next step would be to derive an 268 
optimal HCR for each of these fisheries. 269 
270 
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Supplementary Results 271 
Historic fishing pressure  272 
Table S2 shows the harvesting properties for the scenario of historic fishing pressure (i.e., high 273 
fishing mortality) presented in Fig. 2. The evolutionary model delivers lower total allowable catch 274 
(TAC), total biomass from age 3 onwards and also lower net present value (NPV), while the 275 
spawning stock biomass (SSB) is slightly higher compared to the non-evolutionary model. 276 
In Fig. S1 we show the life-history changes in the scenario of “historic fishing 277 
pressure”, corresponding to Figs. 2 and 3. Genetic adaptations caused by fishing pressure lead 278 
to higher reproductive investment (Fig. S1A) and genetic growth (Fig. S1B). As a result, the 279 
evolving population has consistently larger gonad weight (Fig. S1C) and higher phenotypic 280 
growth (Fig. S1D). Due to evolutionary changes, the ratio between spawning stock biomass and 281 
total biomass changes over time because of a change in maturation schedule (Fig. S2). This may 282 
have implications for stock assessment and the target reference points that are used for 283 
management. 284 
 285 
Alternative discount rates  286 
Table S3 presents optimal harvest control rules (HCR) derived for alternative discount rates. 287 
As expected, higher discount rates lead to slightly higher fishing mortality, even though only 288 
marginally. This may seem surprising, but happens because larger catches result in lower 289 
prices, and hence profits. At a certain point, the resulting profit loss from lower prices 290 
outweighs the profit gain resulting from catching more fish – irrespective of the discount rate; 291 
see also ref. (5).  292 
 293 
 294 
 295 
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Alternative scenarios with constant fishing mortalities 296 
Constant and weight-dependent prices 297 
We probe into the robustness of our results by varying the fishing mortality under 298 
alternative assumptions and investigating how this influences the effects of 299 
evolutionary changes. First, as a theoretical exercise, we assume that sales prices are 300 
independent of the total catch and the price is constant. This is clearly not realistic 301 
for the NEA cod fishery, but certainly the case for many other fisheries. As a 302 
constant price we use the inflation-corrected average kg price in the period 1998-303 
2007 of 12.59 NOK. Second, in addition, we assume that sales prices are weight-304 
dependent, i.e. the price that can be obtained per kg of cod rises with the weight of 305 
the fish. We found little evidence that this is actually the case for the fleet of trawlers 306 
we are considering here, but it may be relevant for other vessel types, notably 307 
smaller coastal vessels. As a theoretical benchmark we can rely on the minimum 308 
prices from the Norwegian fishermen’s sales organization (44). The prices for the 309 
different weight-classes are as follows. Cod that is heavier than 6.5 kg yields 17 310 
NOK/kg. Cod that weighs between 2.5 and 6.5 kg yields 14.25 NOK/kg, while cod 311 
that weighs between 1.0 and 2.5 kg yields 12.25 NOK/kg, and all cod that weighs 312 
less than 1.0 kg yields 9.25 NOK/kg. Table S4 shows the emerging properties of 313 
different fishing mortalities and the NPV for a constant price (NPVCP) and for 314 
weight-dependent prices (NPVWP). For comparison, we also show the NPV derived 315 
from the model used in the main text. We find that our earlier results presented in 316 
Table 1 fully carry over to the case where the price is constant or weight-dependent. 317 
Still, evolution increases the NPV of a fishery if fishing mortality is low, while it 318 
decreases the NPV of a fishery if fishing mortality is high (Table S4). 319 
320 
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Emerging properties for minimum size limits of 25, 45 and 85 cm 321 
Table S5 shows the emerging properties of total allowable catch (TAC), total biomass above 322 
the age of 3, and net present value (NPV) that complement Fig. 4. For a fishing mortality of F 323 
= 0.8 and a minimum size limit equal to 25 cm, both the evolutionary and the non-324 
evolutionary model population goes extinct. When harvest pressure is high and the size limit 325 
is low (=25 cm), the economic losses due to evolution that we see at a size limit of 45 cm, 326 
disappear. The NPV values are overall lower, however, for the 25 cm size limit than for the 327 
45 cm size limit. At a very high minimum size of 85 cm the non-evolutionary model performs 328 
insignificantly better than the evolutionary model, suggesting that economic losses from 329 
evolutionary change are not increasing as minimum sizes increase. Instead, those evolutionary 330 
costs are highest (albeit still small) for a minimum size of 45 cm, a size that is based on 331 
historic values for the Norwegian and Russian cod fisheries (4, 21) and very close to the size 332 
currently used as a legal minimum size (45). Fig. S4 shows the final genetic trait values (year 333 
2100) for different fishing mortalities (F=0.4, 0.8 yr-1) and for different minimum size limits. 334 
We find here that the evolutionary change is larger as fishing mortality increases for all traits 335 
except for growth and that higher minimum size limits result in lower selective pressure and 336 
less evolution (Fig. S4). 337 
 338 
Varying the coefficients of genetic variation and fishing mortality 339 
In the evolutionary version of our model, the coefficient of genetic variation (Table S1) has 340 
been determined empirically by matching trends in age and length at maturation over a 74 341 
year period (i.e. from 1932-2005), ref. (4). The genetic changes emerging from this study are 342 
found to be lower than what has been predicted in comparable studies, such as ref. (1, 7) and 343 
ref. (8, 9). These studies assumed a coefficient of genetic variation for all traits equal to 8% 344 
and 6%, respectively. As a robustness check, we therefore used these higher coefficients of 345 
15 
genetic variation (6% and 8%), and performed simulations for different fishing mortalities. 346 
After fishing with a particular fishing mortality from 1932-2100 we compare the simulation 347 
endpoints for age at maturation and TAC with our calibrated evolutionary model (see Table 348 
S1) and non-evolutionary model (all coefficients of genetic variation are equal to 0). As 349 
expected, we find that an assumed 
,GCVz  of 6% and 8% predicts stronger evolutionary 350 
responses, expressed in much lower age at maturation in year 2100 (see Fig. S3A). As genetic 351 
variance increases, the fish mature at a younger age and at a smaller size, and grow also 352 
faster. As fishing mortality increases, age at maturation also declines for the non-evolutionary 353 
model, which is entirely due to phenotypic plasticity and density dependence in response to a 354 
lower abundance of the stock. For the case where the coefficients of genetic variation are set 355 
to 6% and 8 %, we find that for a given fishing mortality higher TACs can be obtained 356 
compared to the models where evolutionary change is weaker or even absent. This finding 357 
indicates that stronger evolutionary forces tend to have as positive effect on the TAC. This 358 
corraborates our earlier finding that evolution towards higher growth tends to have rather 359 
positive effects on the fishery. 360 
  361 
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Figure legends 478 
Fig. S1. Life-history changes from 1932-2100 in the scenario for “historic fishing pressure” in the 479 
evolutionary (black line) and non-evolutionary model (grey line), corresponding to Fig. 2 and 3 in 480 
the main text. (A) Genetic GSI (gonado-somatic index), (B) genetic growth (cm/year), (C) 481 
average gonad weight (kg), and (D) phenotypic growth (cm/year).  482 
 483 
Fig. S2. Ratio between spawning stock biomass and total biomass from age 3 onwards for the 484 
scenario “historic fishing pressure” in the evolutionary (black line) and non-evolutionary model 485 
(grey line). 486 
 487 
Fig. S3. Simulation endpoints (year 2100) for different coefficients of genetic variation (CV) 488 
and different fishing mortalities. Fishing mortalities were applied from 1932-2100.  Open 489 
circles are for CV=6% for all traits and open squares are for CV=8% for all traits, while grey 490 
circles are the non-evolutionary model and black circles are the evolutionary model used in 491 
the main text (Table S1). (A) Age at maturation (years) and (B) total allowable catch, TAC 492 
(1000 tonnes).  493 
 494 
Fig. S4. Simulation endpoints (year=2100) in the evolving life-history traits for different 495 
minimum size limits and different fishing mortalities. Fishing mortalities were applied from 496 
1932-2100. Results apply to the evolutionary model. Coefficients of genetic variance are the 497 
same as those used in the main text. Initial trait values are shown by the horizontal bold line, 498 
and the arrow shows the direction of evolution.  Black lines and circles are for F=0.4 yr-1 and 499 
grey dashed lines and circles are for F=0.8 yr-1. (A) Probabilistic maturation reaction norm, 500 
PMRN intercept (cm), (B) PMRN slope (cm/year), (C) genetic gonado-somatic index, GSI, 501 
and (D) genetic growth capacity (cm/year). 502 
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Table S1. Parameter values and data sources for the bio-economic model. 
Parameters Value Source 
Biological model 
Initial mean PMRN slope, Gs  0.15 cm yr
–1 1 
Initial mean PMRN intercept, Gi  77.4 cm 1 
Initial mean reproductive investment, GGSI  0.15 2 
Initial mean growth capacity, Gg  11.08 cm 3,4 
PMRN width, w  12.88 cm 1 
Coefficient of genetic variation in PMRN slope, 
s,GCV  10 % 3 
Coefficient of genetic variation in PMRN intercept, i,GCV  2 % 3 
Coefficient of genetic variation in reproductive investment, GSI,GCV  12 % 3 
Coefficient of genetic variation in genetic growth, g,GCV  4 % 3 
Initial heritability, 
2
zh  0.2 5 
Strength of density dependence in growth, x  2.08 10–5 kg–1 3,4 
Reproductive investment conversion factor, γ  0.60241 6 
Allometric constant, k  3.2 10–6 kg cm–j 4 
Allometric exponent, j  3.24 4 
Weight-specific oocyte density, D  4.45 106 kg–1 7 
Maximal growth capacity, maxg  105 cm 3 
Stock-recruitment constant, 1c  0.7549 kg
–1 3,8 
Density-dependent stock-recruitment constant, 2c  -6.0633 kg
–1 3,8 
Temperature coefficient in stock-recruitment, 0c  0.4241 °C
-1 9 
Natural mortality probability, m  0.18 8 
Immature fishing probability in spawning-ground pre-1932 0.38 4 
Immature fishing probability in feeding-ground pre-1932 0.09 4 
Minimum-size limit on feeding grounds 45 cm 4,8 
Economic model 
Intercept of the demand function, 0b  18.88 NOK kg-1 10 
Slope of the demand function, 1b  1.19 10–8 NOK kg-2 10 
Stock-output elasticity α  0.58 10 
Effort-output elasticity β  0.85 10 
Catchability coefficient q  6.17 10–4 tonnes–1days–1 10 
Fixed costs per boat fc  1.55 106 NOK 10 
Variable costs per boat 
vc  131.6 NOK tonnes
-1days-1 10 
Optimal number of tonnage days, 
*e  66,712 tonnes days 10 
Sources: 1= (4, 12); 2= (17); 3= (4); 4= IMR data for NEA cod. Survey data on growth from 1932-2009, 
provided by M.Heino; allometric data from survey 1999–2007, provided by O. R. Kjesbu; data on 
fishing mortality and minimum size limit provided by O.R. Godø; 5= (6); 6= (14); 7= (16); 8= (21); 9=12 
= PINRO, Murmansk and (22, 23); 10 = (32). Data for the economics: costs and harvests from the 
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, provided by P. Sandberg; biomass and total landings from ICES 
(21); demand function from Statistics Norway and Directories of fisheries. Economic values have been 
inflation corrected using the producer price index from the OECD, with year 2000 as a baseline. The 
exchange rate is 1 USD = 5.6 NOK. 
 
Table S2. Mean values corresponding to the historic fishing pressure corresponding to Figure 2. 
Averages of fishing mortality (F), total allowable catch (TAC), total biomass from age 3, 
spawning stock biomass (SSB) are shown with temporal standard deviation in parentheses. The 
NPV is discounted at 2%. 
Model F TAC SSB Biomass NPV 
Evolution 0.68 360 (95) 267 (365) 1103 (562) 17.8 
Ecology 0.68 370 (93) 260 (356) 1167 (526) 18.6 
Units: F (inst. rate); TAC, biomass and SSB (1000 tonnes); NPV (billion USD). 
Table S3. Optimal harvest control rule (HCR) with parameters Fmax, Bmax, and corresponding 
net present value (NPV) for different discount rates (δ), 0, 2 and 4%. Averages of fishing 
mortality (F), total allowable catch (TAC), spawning stock biomass (SSB) are shown with 
temporal standard deviation in parentheses.  
Model δ (%) Fmax Bmax F TAC SSB NPV 
Evolution 0 0.33 100 0.33 467 (60) 801 (163) 96.0 
 2 0.34 20 0.34 469 (60) 767 (163) 25.4 
 4 0.35 20 0.35 470 (60) 735 (155) 12.6 
Ecology 0 0.33 40 0.33 439 (48) 670 (125) 94.7 
 2 0.35 100 0.35 443 (48) 643 (118) 25.3 
 4 0.36 100 0.36 445 (48) 618 (114) 12.6 
Units: Fmax and F (inst. rate); Bmax, TAC, SSB (1000 tonnes); NPV (billion USD). 
 
Table S4. Averages for different constant fishing mortalities (F) from 1932-2100, 
showing total allowable catch, TAC (1000 tonnes), total biomass from age 3 (1000 
tonnes), and net present value, NPV (bill USD) for a discount rate of 2% assuming a 
constant price (NPVCP) and weight-dependent prices (NPVWP). For comparison we also 
show the NPV derived from the model used in the main text. Temporal standard 
deviation for TAC and biomass is given in parentheses. 
F Model TAC Biomass NPVCP NPVWP NPV 
0.2 Evolution 400 (55) 2686 (375) 25.7 30.5 23.1 
0.2 Non-evolutionary 375 (42) 2503 (277) 24.6 29.2 23.0 
0.4 Evolution 473 (60) 1779 (216) 27.3 31.5 25.2 
0.4 Non-evolutionary 449 (51) 1711 (178) 26.47 30.8 25.1 
0.6 Evolution 429 (70) 1208 (176) 21.41 23.8 21.6 
0.6 Non-evolutionary 427 (66) 1246 (164) 22.1 24.8 22.3 
0.8 Evolution 335 (90) 800 (191) 13.0 13.9 14.7 
0.8 Non-evolutionary 354 (85) 889 (176) 15.1 16.6 16.7 
Units: F (inst. rate); TAC and total biomass (1000 tonnes); NPV (billion USD). 
 
Table S5. Net present value (NPV), total allowable catch (TAC), and total biomass 
for the minimum size limits 25, 45 and 85 cm across different constant fishing 
mortalities (F). Values shown for TAC and total biomass (1000 tonnes) are averages 
for 1932-2100 with temporal standard deviation in parentheses. The NPV (bill USD) 
is given for a discount rate of 2%.  
Minimum size limit (cm) 
25 45 85 
F Evolution Ecology Evolution Ecology Evolution Ecology 
TAC 
0.2 337 (48) 310 (34) 400 (154) 375 (42) 222 (50) 215 (54) 
0.4 325 (58) 283 (49) 473 (60) 449 (51) 336 (65) 331 (55) 
0.6 217 (79) 170 (79) 429 (69) 426 (66) 401 (70) 398 (60) 
0.8 - - 335 (91) 354 (86) 441 (71) 446 (67) 
NPV 
0.2 20.7 20.2 23.1 23 13.4 12.9 
0.4 16.9 15.5 25.2 25.1 19.1 19.7 
0.6 6.4 4.51 21.6 22.3 22.0 22.8 
0.8 - - 14.7 16.7 23.6 24.5 
Biomass 
0.2 2026 (309) 1852 (221) 2689 (374) 2505 (276) 3914 (535) 3833 (479) 
0.4 1034 (191) 896 (159) 1778 (216) 1709 (178) 3639 (446) 3590 (446) 
0.6 487 (183) 385 (184) 1208 (176) 1245 (165) 3464 (395) 3438 (423) 
0.8 - - 798 (193) 888 (178) 3341 (365) 3324 (382) 
Units: F (inst. rate), TAC and total biomass (1000 tonnes), NPV (billion USD).  
 
